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1 Introduction
The regularities and motives of war have been the subject of a large body
of military studies.1 In the current paper, a particular type of war is un-
der focus: asymmetric warfare between two countries with different military
strengths. Large empires in particular, tend to control and even attack on
their smaller neighbors.2 This paper studies an asymmetric war in the spirit
of the predator-victim framework, addressing two related issues: (i) why does
a smaller victim fight harder than a larger predator, and (ii) what are the
implications of such commitment to deterrence and defence policy?
Over the course of history, no common motivation for war in general is
available. Political science views appear to acknowledge the geopolitical fac-
tors. Economists have mostly considered wars as contests, largely neglecting
other motivations for warfare. The proposal that the victims often fight
harder than the predators is not new (cf. Hirshleifer (1991)). Motivational
determinants apparently need to be integrated into the theory in a deeper
and more consistent way to explain such behaviour.3 The paper introduces
an economic approach building on the biological and evolutionary founda-
tion advanced by Hirshleifer (1998). A unique feature of the model is that
soldiers choose how much warfighting risk to take on themselves as a build-
ing block for the theory of defence and deterrence. The paper introduces
a well-defined intergenerational altruistic preference structure of individual
fighters in conditions where the risk of death is the choice variable. The sur-
vival probability of the offspring is part of the altruistic preference structure
of the individual soldiers.4 To further motivate such a research agenda, the
1The survey by Levy (1989), for example, has 800 references.
2The literature has long differentiated the cases of defensive and offensive wars (see
Arce, Kovenock and Robertson (2012) and the papers there). Alesina and Spolaore (2003)
have suggested a theory of (peaceful) formation of country size in terms of public goods
and heterogeneity of preferences. They also study the connection between conflicts and
the size of nations.
3In his Bioeconomic Causes of War, Hirshleifer (1998) concluded that “in biological
terms the ultimate functional motives for fighting are food and sex, the essential elements
for reproductive success. Like many other animals, humans seek food and sex directly,
but also indirectly via dominance or prestige. But, although largely disconnected from
reproductive success, intangible goals such as prestige, dominance, and respect - amplified
by the ’affiliative instinct’ - remain with us as continuing causes of war”.
4Adam Smith wrote: “Every man feels his own pleasure...After himself, the members
of his own family...are naturally the objects of his warmest affections” (Smith (1853), p.
321). In Becker (1991), altruism is viewed as the primary motive for intergenerational
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current paper recalls that it is indeed the fight of the current generation for
the survival of its offspring that is the fundamental mechanism in all nature.
This concerns all living creatures, even including plants.5
The literature on military studies justifies the view that motivational
reasons for war, conflict, and aggression are many. The soldiers can care
about a country winning the war for a number of reasons.6 Such a psycho-
analytic view was advanced by Fornari (1975), who claimed that sacrifice is
the essence of war: it translates into the willingness of humans to die for
their country. Of course, the paper does not challenge the literature of the
military studies or of other motives. Our paper suggests that when it is a
matter of survival for a victim to resist an attack by a stronger predator,
the fundamental altruistic motives may become relevant. This concept is
supported by many examples.7 In 480 BC, the vastly outnumbered Greeks
held off the Persians for seven days in the battle at the pass of Thermopylae
in the most remarkable defence battle in history. In 1565, 700 Johannite
knights and 8000 Maltese soldiers successfully defenced Malta island against
an Ottomans attack by an army of 40 000, more than four times greater. The
Vietkong guerrillas were able to beat the more advanced US army during the
1960s. In the three-and-a-half-month Winter War of 1939, the Finnish army
stopped Stalin’s Red Army (though it was three times stronger), and did so
for the second time in 1944 in the Battle of Tali-Ihantala (with the Red Army
having four times the superior power), the largest-ever battle in the Nordic
countries. Moreover, though it was five times larger, the Russian Red Army
was defeated when it attacked the smaller German-Estonian defence forces
at the Siltama¨e battles in July and August 1944 causing a substantial loss of
family relations.
5The fight for fitness is a neverending process at all levels of life. The metaphor of the
“selfish gene”, introduced by biologist Richard Dawkins in the 1970s, has established its
place as the fundamental law of life. William Hamilton, another biologist, had established
the role of kinship in this process, while others have qualified it subsequently. At the
highest level of conflict, the fight is between various species.
6The motives, as suggested by one of the referees, may include the pride of being part
of a grand and victorious nation, dreaming of a posthumous plaque at a future victory
monument, etc.
7As the referee correctly points out, the analytic solution of the model world of the
current paper does not depend on the background motivational “story”. When competing
theories for individual choices are around, the economic approach must be based on spec-
ifying the underlying preferences, derivation of propositions concerning behaviour, and
asking what the tastable implications are.
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men.8
The economic theory of conflicts was initiated by Schelling (1960, 1966).
Based on Tullock (1967, 1980), tools for an economic approach to the theory
of conflicts have addressed the question of the likely winner in a conflict and
subsequently extended to a large research area by Hirshleifer (1991), Bueno
de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and
Morrow (2003), Jackson and Morelli (2007), and Bevia´ and Corcho´n (2008).
Konrad (2009) elaborated and extended this work in several directions. Ben-
son, Meirowitz and Ramsay (2014) showed that the effect of moral hazard
in alliances can improve security. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) examined
the occurrence of interstate conflicts and the degree of relatedness between
countries. The issue of the commitment of individual soldiers to the na-
tional defence has been addressed in sociological and psychological research
by a number of authors, including Salo (2011)9, Nokkala (2014)10 and Sinkko
(2015)11 among others. The paper introduces first an analysis of the risk-
taking and commitment of an individual soldier in providing the defence
effort in a predator-victim model. Each individual soldier is risk averse and
is assumed to face the risk of death resulting both from exogenous reasons
beyond his control and from his own choice in a conflict situation. It is then
8Those successful defence battles appear to qualify the position by von Clausewitz
(1943, p. 293) stating that “...one will search in vain for a battle in which the winning
side triumphed over an army twice its size”.
9In Salo (2011), the unit cohesion was understood as a process of social integration
among members of a primary group with its leaders and the larger secondary groups of
which they are a part. The results showed that platoons with strong primary-group co-
hesion differed from other platoons in terms of performance, training quality, secondary-
group experiences, and attitudes towards refresher training. At the sociometric level,
soldiers who were chosen as friends by others were found to be more likely to have higher
expected performance, better performance ratings, more positive attitudes towards mil-
itary service, higher levels of well-being during conscript service, and fewer exemptions
from duty during it. At the group level, the selection of the respondents’ own group leader
rather than a leader from outside (i.e., leader bonding) had a bearing not only on cohe-
sion and performance, but also on the social, attitudinal, and behavioural criteria. The
sociological studies on the motives of the soldiers also include Shils and Janowitz (1948),
Siebold (2007), and Wong, Kolditz, Millen and Potter (2003).
10Nokkala (2014) suggested in particular that the ability to defend is determined by
commitment.
11In his survey among the draftees, Sinkko examined the relation between the commit-
ment to defend and the trust of a soldier in himself and in the group, the social capital
among the draftees, and several psychological mechanisms. For studies in cooperative
behaviour in groups, a reference can be made to Kolmar (2013).
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assumed that the risky operations call for collective actions and group cohe-
sion. In particular, the commitment of providing a risky effort is assumed
to arise from the intertemporally altruistic preference towards the offspring.
The soldier values both his own life and the life of his child. The defence
effort of the soldiers results in an externality on the safety of the civilians.
An individual soldier, however, is assumed to value the externality on the life
of his child alone, not on the life of co-citizens and their children. The pa-
per shows that in the commitment equilibrium, there is no underprovision of
effort.12 Moreover, though the created national security is a non-excludable
public good, the civilians who free ride on the externality are financing its
production through their tax liability. When building its national security,
a potential victim hopes to communicate to the predator that it is commit-
ted to defending itself, by investing ex ante in defence. Under informational
asymmetries, however, it may be difficult to convincingly communicate such
a commitment.
The main results of the paper are as follows. In the commitment equilib-
rium, intergenerational altruism can explain why the defending army fights
hard, and even more so when the predator’s military capacity is large. Small
armies in particular fight harder than large armies. The implications for de-
terrence and defence policy are shown to be important. Indeed, the second
set of results concerns the optimal size of the army. In the absence of infor-
mational constraints, there is a unique army size for deterrence. Under infor-
mational restrictions, a pooling equilibrium may exist where a victim with
strong intergenerational altruism overinvests in its army while the victim
with a more limited intergenerational altruism free rides on the information
gap of the predator building a smaller army. Conditions for the existence of
a separating equilibrium are established in terms of the cost of war. A victim
with a high perceived cost of war tends to be willing to build a large army as
a costly signal with the purpose of being differentiated from a victim with a
lower perceived cost of war. It turns out that the optimal defence policy need
not satisfy the deterrence requirement, but rather the optimal army size is
determined by the elasticities of the utility with respect to the tax cost and
the probability of victory relative to the army size. The case of separating
equilibrium helps to explain why wars exist in equilibrium.
12Intuitively, a commitment equilibrium represents a state where the soldiers of the
defending army collectively provide a risky defence effort which is in line with the proba-
bilistic survival of themselves and of their offspring.
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2. Life and Death: a Model of a Soldier
2.1 Military threat and national defence budget
The war game between a predator and a victim is asymmetric. The preda-
tor is a ruthless aggressor aiming at capturing the resource of the victim,
R. There are two stages in the model world of Section 2. In stage 0, the
victim becomes the subject of a threat from the predator.13 To deter the
aggression, the victim invests in its national defence ex ante to establish a
credible commitment to defence communicating such a commitment to the
predator. In stage 1, the threat is deterred or will break out as a war. The
victim has the option of surrendering in stage 1.
The adult population of the victim country is a mass of size N >> 1.
In stage 0, part of the population of the victim is drafted or employed in
the military. There are two types of careers in the victim country, a civilian
career and a soldier career.14 The size of the victim army is the optimising
variable of the victim and is denoted by n. The size of the adult civilian
population is thus N − n. Each (civilian and military) adult has one child.
Thus, the total population in the victim country is 2N.15
The income of each civilian adult in stage 0 is Y = Y (R), Y ′(R) > 0
where R is the resource of the victim. It is lost if the war is lost. If the war is
deterred or the attacker defeated, the economy remains stationary with the
civilian income remaining at the level Y , net of the potential cost of the war.
The civilian income is used to finance the consumption of the civilians, Cˆ,
of their children, cˆ, and of the soldiers, C, and their children, c, through the
defence budget, which is tax-financed. If the war is lost, the consumption by
all society members falls and is set to zero, if only to simplify the notation.
It will be assumed that the consumption within the civilian career equals
13One can think that in stage -1, the predator has invested in its military strength to
subsequently capture the victim.
14It is easiest to think that the defence army in the current model is based on a stochastic
draft. Kanniainen and Ringbom (2016) show how the theory of a voluntary army can
be developed to include the non-arbitrage condition between the civilian and military
remuneration in civilian and military careers. Earlier, a similar condition was worked out
by Poutvaara and Wagener (2007). If there is heterogeneity in intergenerational altruism,
then altruism is also likely to drive the selection of soldiers into professional armies as one
of the referees has suggested.
15N and n can be thought of as integers. In the subsequent analysis, they are employed
as if they were continuous variables whenever derivatives are developed with respect to
them. This is to avoid the use of cumbersome 4- operations.
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for all adults and children, and the same holds true for the soldier careers.
The social contract dictates that the expected utilities of the two types of
careers, to be denoted later in the paper by E[U ] and E[V ], are equalised
through the tax system.16 Civilian adults pay a tax T from their income
to be allocated to finance the living costs of the soldiers and their children.
Thus, the consumption of a civilian adult in stage 0 is
Cˆ = Y − T − cˆ (1)
and is similar in stage 1 if the victim is able to defeat the predator. The
defence budget in stage 0 then is
D = (N − n)T = n(Cˆ + cˆ) (2)
The required tax revenue to finance the defence budget is thus
T =
2n
N − nCˆ. (3)
2.2 Risk of death
Each soldier faces the risk of a premature death arising from two sources.
First, there is an exogenous risk of death, which is inversely related to the
size of the army. The exogenous source of risk is always present in military
confrontations and a soldier cannot insure against it. The probability of death
for the exogenous reason for each soldier is taken as σ(n/nP ), σ
′(n) < 0, i.e.
it is negatively related to the size of the defending army relative to that of
the predator, n/nP .
17
The second source of risk is endogenous. It arises from the risky defence
effort by an individual soldier, i , and is denoted by ei. It is measured by
the endogenous probability of death, satisfying 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1. The residual
probability of surviving then is 1 − ei. The two risk sources are taken to be
16One can think that the social contract involving a (more) risky military career demands
a risk premium requiring C > Cˆ, as the civilians outsource the risk of death to the soldiers.
One way to introduce such a scheme is to build a fund to finance the consumption of the
children of the soldiers who die. The current model abstracts from this qualification.
17The exogenous risk is included for completeness. It does not interact with the incentive
conditions studied below.
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independent random variables.18 Though a soldier faces the risk of death,
there is also a risk-free option with ei = 0, i.e., the option of fleeing repre-
senting a corner solution.19
It is assumed that the probability for the victim country to successfully
resist the attack and thus to win the defence war is given by 0 ≤ P ≤ 1 if
the war breaks out. The war is costly for both the victim and the predator.
The costs are measured by nPk and nK for the victim and for the predator,
respectively, where k > 0, K > 0.
2.3 Intergenerational altruism
In the formal model, the soldiers are expected utility maximisers optimis-
ing their death probabilities.20 A soldier values his own life and the life of
his child. He does not value the life of his fellow citizens—unless they are
relatives.21 For each individual soldier, the state of the world is a binary
random variable. The soldier chooses the risk level of his action in terms of
the probability that he is alive, 0 ≤ 1 − ei ≤ 1, and dead, 0 < ei < 1. The
degree of commitment is a continuous decision variable. Risk -loving action
is not excluded.22
For the children of the soldier and of the civilian, the state of the world
is a binary random variable, too. A child may or may not survive. He
18Risk-taking at a higher level in military decisionmaking is quite another issue and
separate from individual risk-taking. In war, fundamental choices are undertaken by the
leaders, not by the individual soldiers. This explains the exogenous source of risk. The
motives of the leadership are essential to understand as they determine the exogenous risk
of death. If the size of the army is large, the leaders can take greater risks: then the risk
of the army being totally destroyed is small. The risk tolerance of the leadership, then, is
large. This illustrates that the presence of the exogenous source of risk has nothing to do
with the altruistic motive of a soldier. In a military conflict, the leadership has to value
the life of a soldier as part of a strategic choice. The soldier himself, however, values his
life relative to the life of his offspring.
19An argument is often stated that draftees fight for their families while professional
ones fight for the money. This argument fails if the draftees do not have a family and the
professionals do. However, those in a reserve typically have offspring, which creates the
incentives studied in the current paper.
20This is not to deny that the risk-taking in the operations is partly based on intuition
and partly on rational choice, cf. Sutherland (2011). In a more general model of safety
production, manpower and technology can be combined in the production function of
national safety.
21This is based on Hamilton (1964).
22Recall the Japanese kamikaze suicide pilots!
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or she survives only if the war does not break out or if the victim defeats
the attacker. An individual soldier is unable to make a difference as to the
probability of the victory of the war, but the army as a whole can.
The expected utility of an individual soldier is assumed to be cardinal
and with intergenerationally altruistic preferences stated as23
E [U(C(ei), c(ei))] =
∑
τ
piτF [u(Cτ (ei)), v(cτ (ei)] , (4)
where the function F will be speficied below, where the probabilities of the
states of the world are piτ and where the consumption of the soldier and the
consumption of his offspring - to be repeated - are C, c, respectively.
The partial derivatives of the utility function are positive; the second
partials are negative,
u(0) = v(0) = 0, u′(C) > 0, u′′(C) < 0, v′(c) > 0, v′′(c) < 0.
In what follows, a simplication will be introduced with u(C ) = v(c) when
C = c. If the war breaks out, there are ex post four possible states of the
world in the model for each soldier: (i) the victim country is successful in
its defence, the soldier is alive and the child survives, (ii) the soldier dies
but the war is won and the child survives (iii) the war is lost, (hence) the
soldier dies and the child does not survive, and (iv) the war is lost but
the soldier survives.24 The probabilities of the states of the world are pidi =
((1− ei)P, eiP, ei(1− P ), (1− ei)(1− P )). Under non-survival, consumption
and utility are zero. When the war is lost, the predator confiscates the
resource R of the victim. Without losing generality and if only to economize
in notation, it is taken that the consumption of the victim population is zero
23It is explicit from this formulation that the soldier disregards the externality of his
action on the civilians and their children, who actually benefit from the public good
nature of the national defence. Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) have suggested in their
influential work that people are more inclined to avoid the loss rather than the gain in
risky choices. This proposal appears particularly relevant in matters of life and death.
The current analysis, based on the expected utility theorem, is subject to this criticism.
However, it can be motivated as a first step in introducing the analysis if risk-taking under
intergenerational altruism.
24Notice that in case (iii), the soldier dies when fighting, but in case (iv) he dies because
of zero consumption.
8
when the war is lost. The associated consumptions of the soldier families are
(C, c), (0, c), (0, 0),(0, 0).
To develop the expression for the probability of winning the war, P, it
is appropriate to invoke the idea of Tullock (1967, 1980). Konrad (2009)
extended this approach to the case where an alliance of players contests
against a third player. The alliance approach can be extended to model a
war between two armies. Based on the additivity property in success, the
model predicts the probability of victory in the war between nP soldiers of
the predator and n < nP solders of the victim as follows
P =
∑n
i=1 ei∑n
i=1 ei +
∑nP
i=1Ei
. (5)
Here Ei is used to measure the military effort of the soldiers in the predator
army, taken to be exogenous. As the child of a soldier of the predator army
soldier is not at risk, and it is appropriate to think of differentiated incentives,
ei ≥ Ei.25
Abstracting for a moment from imperfect commitment, it is appropriate
to introduce the notation ei = e
∗, Ei = E∗ to point to committed uniform
risk-taking. Then the above expression simplifies to
P (n, e∗, N,E∗) =
ne∗
ne∗ +m
. (6)
where the military strength of the predator is expressed as m = nPE
∗. The
aggregated military strength will be denoted by M = ne∗ + m. Clearly, the
winning probability is strictly concave in e∗ for 0 ≤ e∗ ≤ 1; ∂P/∂e∗ =
nm/M2 > 0, ∂2P/∂e∗2 = −2n2m/M3. Commitment gives rise to mutual
externalities as the effect of individual commitment is limited to m/M2 <
nm/M2. However, in commitment equilibrium, no underprovision of safety
arises. As the expression P (n, e∗, N,E∗) is rather cumbersome, a shorter
version will occationally be introduced.
For the subsequent analysis below, it is helpful to evaluate the welfare
measures under different scenarios. Those include: (i) successful deterrence,
(ii) failing deterrence where the conflict breaks out into a war, and (iii) the
victim surrendering without a fight.
25One should distuingish “winning a war” from “winning a battle” if the war consists
of a series of battles.
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(i) Successful deterrence Under successful deterrence, the welfare of the
victim is
W (Cˆ, cˆ, C, c) = (N − n)
{
U(Cˆ(Y, cˆ, T, n)) + U(cˆ)
}
+n {U(C(e)) + U(c)} . (7)
To explicate, the cost of war is avoided and the welfare is equal to the sum
of the utilities.
(ii) Failing deterrence The case of failing deterrence means that the
victim suffers a sunk cost nPk > 0 from the war related to the size of the
predator army. Moreover, the outcome of the conflict is uncertain. The
probability of a successful resistance, however, remains positive for the victim
and is given by P . Its expected welfare is
E[W (Cˆ, cˆ, C, c)] = (N − n)
{
E[U(Cˆ(Y, cˆ, T, n))] + E[U(cˆ)]
}
+n {E[U(C(e))] + E[U(c)]} − nPk. (8)
.
(iii) Surrendering The option of surrendering can be exercised if the cost
of war is considered large. When surrendering, the welfare of each member in
the population of a surrendering victim is assumed to be given by the utility
of an exogenous survival income level Y0;
W s = nW (Y0). (9)
The option of surrendering has value only if the welfare under surrendering
exceeds the expected utility under fighting. Thus, the option value can be
stated as
v = max
[
0,W s − E
[
W (Cˆ, cˆ, C, c)
]]
(10)
Interesting enough, the predator may have an incentive to promise a sufficient
survival income Y0 to induce the victim to surrender without fighting, though
at the expense of losing the resource R.26
In the analysis below, it will become important to evaluate the ranking
of the three alternative outcomes,
26Under surrendering, the predator has no reason to retaliate.
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{
W (Cˆ, cˆ, C, c), E[W (Cˆ, cˆ, C, c)], W s
}
.
2.4 Commitment to risky action under risk aversion
The expected utility of each soldier (4), assumed to be additively separable
and expressed through the F-function in (4), will now be specified as
E [U(ei)] = (1− ei − σ(n/nP ))u(C) + θP (n, ei, e−i∗,m)v(c). (11)
where a shorter notation E [U(ei)] = E [U(C(ei), c(ei))] has been adopted.
In this welfare expression, the parameter θ > 0 measures the valuation of the
life of the future generation by the current generation. Verbally, the expected
utility of the soldier is the sum of the utility of being alive multiplied by the
probability of being alive and the utility of the next generation conditional
on the victory of the victim country. In (11), ei is the decision of soldier i
and e−i∗ is the collective decision of the rest of the soldiers. The first-order
condition of soldier i is given by
E [U ′(ei)] = −u(C) + θ
(
∂P (n, ei, e−i∗,m)
∂ei
)
v(c) = 0. (12)
Recall the assumption u(C) = v(c) when C = c. Use ∂P/∂ei = m/M
2 from
(5) to arrive at,
ei =
√
θm−m
n
(13)
A soldier may opportunistically access a risk-free choice (ei = 0) at the
corner. But then, if all soldiers behave similarly, the next generation has
no future. The equilibrium outcome is lost war. It can be called a chicken
equilibrium. Therefore and under joint commitment, a soldier with a higher
θ is ready to take some risk of death, ei > 0, at the cost of the reduced
probability of surviving himself, 1 − ei < 1. However, there is a limit: as
shown below, the expected utility of a soldier is strictly concave in the death
probability ei, catching his risk aversion towards the risk of death. Empirical
examples of such an equilibrium are many. From here on, the current paper
will focus on the commitment equilibrium. A question is raised about what
11
the collective risk-taking has to be for maximising the expected utility.27 We
state.
PROPOSITION 1. Under unified commitment, ei = e∗ for all i, and if
m/n < θ < (n+m)2 /mn, the utility maximising commitment is given by
ei = e∗ =
√
θmn−m
n
. (14)
PROOF. The objective function is continuous with continuous derivatives
everywhere. The effect of risky effort on the probability of victory is positive,
∂P (n, e∗,m)/∂e∗= nm/M2 > 0. Then (14) qualifies as the unique inte-
rior solution under collective commitment if it satisfies 0 < e∗ < 1, which
holds for
m/n < θ <
(n+m)2
mn
.
The second-order condition for an interior maximum at 0 < e∗ < 1 is
E [U ′′(e∗)] = ∂
2E [U(e∗)]
∂e∗2 = −θ
2n2m
M3
< 0,
which is satisfied. QED
The utility function adopted therefore exhibits risk aversion. It is a bit
more complicated than the standard expression as behavioral characterisa-
tion because it captures the idea of collective commitment of the defence
group. There is more to it. If it is the case that the intergenerational altru-
ism θ is bigger than the stated upper limit, θ > (n+m)
2
mn
, the solution satisfies
e∗ = 1 what can be called a kamikaze equilibrium. Alternatively, if θ < m/n,
we have e∗ = 0. Note that the fighting intensity depends both on θ which
is a parameter and n which is a policy variable. In what follows, our focus
will be in the equilibrium where their joint impact maintains the condition
0 < e∗ < 1. 28
27One of the referees has called this a planner’s solution, which is fully appropriate.
28The choice of an individual soldier depends on his expectations concerning the choice
of the co-soldiers. If no one is committed, the war will be lost for sure and there is no gain
for an individual soldier to commit himself alone. The war equilibrium is thus conditional
on expectations and the case of multiple war equilibria can arise as follows. The army is a
collective group of individuals with private knowledge of their capability of committing to
risky actions. It is privately optimal opportunistically to deviate from the collective action
given the expectations that the co-soldiers do not. Commitment has a strong presence in
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Some additional results are reported:
COROLLARY 1. The intergenerational altruism has a positive impact on
risk-taking
∂e∗
∂θ
> 0.
PROOF. Straightforward.
COROLLARY 2. The military strength of the enemy makes the soldiers
of the victim take more risk , ∂e∗/∂m > 0 if θ > 4m/n.
PROOF. Straightforward.
The next result is rather important. It proves Hirshleifer’s (1991) view
in the current framework.
PROPOSITION 2. Under uniform commitment and with sufficiently
large intergenerational altruism, (θ > 4m/n) soldiers in a small army fight
harder than in a large army.
PROOF. Differentiating,
∂e∗
∂n
=
1
n2
[
−1
2
√
θmn+m
]
.
Thus,
∂e∗
∂n
< 0
if and only if
θ >
4m
n
. QED
the celebrated war film “The Thin Red Line” by Terrence Malick. To eliminate the oppor-
tunism, punishments are needed to support the individual commitment. When Stalin’s
Red Army attacked Finland in 1939 and 1944, the attacking troops were fired upon not
only by the Finns from the front. The fleeing soldiers were fired also by the Soviet military
from the back to impose the commitment of attacking. Wikipedia reports: “During World
War II, NKVD Internal Troops units were used for rear area security, including preventing
the retreat of Soviet Union army divisions. Though mainly intended for internal security,
NKVD divisions were sometimes used at the front to stem the occurrence of desertion
through Stalin’s Order No. 270 and Order No. 227 decrees in 1941 and 1942, which aimed
to raise troop morale via brutality and coercion.”
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However, a small army always remains weaker than a larger one in that
the total military strength, ne*, increases with army size:
COROLLARY 3. The total military strength, ne*, increases with army
size.
PROOF. Evaluating,
∂(ne∗)
∂n
=
1
2n
√
θmn > 0.QED
Moreover, the probability of winning a war increases with army size,
though at a declining rate. Denoting in short P = P (n),
COROLLARY 4. The probability of victory, P, is strictly concave in the
size of the committed army, n, P ′(n) > 0, P ′′(n) < 0.
PROOF. The proof is obtained by straightforward derivation.
Thus, though the total military strength is increasing in the army size,
it is increasing at a declining rate. This follows from the effect of the army
size on the fighting effort of the soldiers.
The results of the current section on the collectively optimal effort provi-
sion have a useful interpretation. Mutual effort provision results in external
effects in that the offspring of all soldiers benefit from the effort provision
of all co-soldiers. The externalities are effectively internalized.29 These re-
sults have implications for the optimal design of the defence strategy at the
national level to be studied next.
3. Building the Defence to Deter an Attack
Consider the case where deterrence is considered as the desired national tar-
get. To deter an attack, the victim builds an army, which raises the threshold
for the predator sufficiently to keep it indifferent between attacking and not
29The author is indebted to one of the referees for a helpful evaluation of the results of
this section. There is a further extension of the model, though not included in the current
paper. From the point of view of life insurance, each soldier’s best strategy is to keep
his partner, the co-soldier, alive. This model could easily be extended to incorporate this
mechanism, which would further enhance the incentive of risk-taking. Levine and Modica
(2016) show that free riding problems can be overcome through costly peer punishment,
creating self-sustaining group discipline.
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attacking. In this section, the case of perfect information is considered.30 In-
formational constraints complicate the analysis and are considered in Section
4. Having a large army raises the social cost of public funds, reducing con-
sumption at the margin. There is also a gain: the cost of war to the predator,
nK, increases in the investment of the victim. The victim has communicated
to the predator its commitment to defend i.e. ne∗. The predator faces the
question of whether to attack or whether to give up. Given the defence com-
mitment of the victim, e∗, the probability of the victory is 1 − P (n, e∗,m)
for the predator. Then, the predator is indifferent to attacking or giving up
if the expected gain satisfies
E [ΠP ] = [1− P (n, e∗,m)]R− nK = 0. (15)
This condition states the deterrence condition. Recalling ∂P/∂n > 0, ∂P/∂e∗ >
0, and totally differentiating (15), one obtains
de∗
dn
= −K/R + ∂P/∂n
∂P/∂e∗
< 0. (16)
Therefore, the deterrence (no-attack) condition of the predator is given by
a negative relation between the army size n and the commitment effort of
the victim, e∗ in its safety strategy. Risky effort and the size of the army
appear as substitutes from the point of view of the national defence policy.
Intuitively, the limited defence capacity of a victim can be compensated by a
strong fighting effort.
Given the information of the victim’s army size and the commitment of
its soldiers, there is a unique probability for the predator to winning the war.
The threshold army size for deterrence is derived in what follows.
Recalling (6) and (14), the indifference condition can be re-written as
n
√
θmn =
R
K
m,
which can be solved as
30The approach in Section 3 considers the case known as honest signalling with separat-
ing equilibrium earlier analysed by Bergstrom and Lachmann (2001), among others. They
derived the necessary and sufficient conditions for the alarm calls of the whatchful babbler
where the function of the signal is to deter predation and where the predator takes into
account the alarm call that has been sent.
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n =
(
R
K
)2/3
m1/3
[√
1
θ
]2/3
. (17)
We can state
PROPOSITION 3. Under honest signalling concerning the degree of com-
mitment to defence, there is a unique solution for the optimal size of the
victim’s army to deter an attack. The army size needed to deter an attack
is larger, the lower is intertemporal altruism (∂n/∂θ < 0), the greater is
the rent at stake (∂n/∂R > 0), the less costly is the war for the predator
(∂n/∂K < 0) and the larger is the army of the predator (∂n/∂m > 0).
PROOF. From above.
Notice that, strong fighting effort reduces the required recruitment to
obtain deterrence, ∂n/∂θ < 0.
What the attacking enemy is interested in is its winning probability of
war, namely the military strength of the victim, ne* . It depends on the
intertemporal altruism of the victim army,
∂(ne∗)
∂θ
= n
(
∂e∗
∂θ
)
+
(
∂n
∂θ
)
e ∗ [1 + εe∗n] ,
where the first term, the effect of altruism on the figting effort, is positive
while the second term, the effect of altruism on the policy decision on the
army size, is negative. The latter effect depends on the elasticity of the risk-
taking by the soldiers on the army size, εe∗n < 0. In the model world of the
current paper, the second term can be positive or negative. It is plausible,
however, that it cannot outweigh the effect of the first term. The next sec-
tions can therefore safely be discussed in terms of the following assumption,
ASSUMPTION 1. Strong intertemporal altruism in the defending army
increases the probability for the victim to win the war.
4. Information Asymmetry: Signalling with
the Army Size
In the above, it has been taken that the victim is able to truthfully commu-
nicate to the predator its commitment to defend, or alternatively that the
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predator is able to perfectly monitor the commitment of the victim. The com-
mitment of soldiers is determined by altruistic preferences, basically through
the θ−parameter. Victims with different θ-preferences have a different ability
to provide security for their citizens. If anything, this parameter, however, is
private information of the soldiers. This implies that it may appear a difficult
task to communicate the strength of the altruistic motive to the predator,
and thereby the risk-taking by the soldiers. A credible signal would be help-
ful. In the current model, the natural signal is the army size n which has
been shown to have a systematic effect on the risk taking incentive.31
In this section, the information asymmetry is introduced into the analysis.
The type of victim is alternatively a high-θ victim or a low-θ victim with
probabilities pH and pL where pH+pL = 1. It is assumed that the commitment
of soldiers in the victim country, e∗, determined by intergenerational altruism
θ, cannot necessarily be truthfully predicted by the predator. The victim has
the option of investing in a costly signal to convince the predator of its ability
to defend. The size of the army provides a costly and therefore credible signal.
We show in this section that a large defence army can reduce the probability
of an attack in a pooling equilibrium for both types of victims. Subsequently,
the qustion is raised as to whether a separating equilibrium can exist.
The game in this section is a Bayesian extensive game with observable
actions, and it has the following structure: there are two players, a predator
and a victim, and the game is played in three stages. In stage 0, nature
chooses the type of victim (high—or low-θ). The victim is informed of its
type. The value of θ is private information to the defender. In stage 1, the
victim undertakes an action in terms of how large an army to build. Thus,
the pre-war communication takes place in stage 1. The investment is costly
and the army size can operate as a means for the defender to communicate
(to signal) its willingness to defend to the predator. In stage 2, the predator
either attacks or does not. The strategy space of the predator therefore
consists of a discrete choice {attack, do not attack}; the strategy space of
the victim arises from an investment in the army {sufficient to deter the
attack, accept the war but resist the attack}. We suggest that two types of
perfect Bayesian equilibrium can exist.
31Other potential signals include the technology stance of the army, the skills of the
soldiers, and their training.
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(a) Pooling equilibrium with no signaling Consider the case where
the predator knows that the victim is one of two potential types (θL, θH)
with known probabilities (pH , pL). Intuitively, it is plausible that the high-θ
country which would have lessof a reason to have a large army than a low-θ
country because its fighting incentive is greater. We suggest, however, that a
pooling equilbrium exists when both types of victims preferring deterrence,
choose the same army size say n∗H = n
∗
L = n
∗, and where the predator is
indifferent between attacking or abstaining from the attack. We show,
PROPOSITION 4. (Pooling equilibrium). There is a unique size for the
victim’s army which is sufficient to create deterrence for both types. The type
H victim suffers from the informational constraint of the predator as a result
of the negative externality from the possibility of being of type L.
PROOF. Using (14) and (15), the zero profit indifference condition of the
predator can be written as
piP =
[
pH
m√
θHnm
+ pL
m√
θLnm
]
R− nK = 0. (18)
This is an algebraic equation in the army size n. The first term in (18)
is monotonically declining in n, while nK is monotonically increasing in n.
Their intersection, say n∗, provides the unique solution in terms of the army
size, expressed as
n∗ =
(
R
K
)2/3
m1/3
[
pH
√
1
θH
+ pL
√
1
θL
]2/3
. (19)
In this solution, the army size of both types of victims is positively related
to the value of its resource, R, and the military strength of the predator, m,
but inversely related to the cost of attack for the predator, K . However,
an expansion of the military strength of the attacker calls for less than a
proportional increase in the defender’s army. The army size is negatively
related to the intertemporal altruism of the victim. We notice that when
informational restrictions create confusion for the predator, a country with a
low commitment to defend exerts a negative externality on the country with a
high commitment. The latter country suffers because it has to choose a higher
tax rate and overinvest in its army to create deterrence. The smaller is θL,
the greater has the army of not only of the victim of type low-θ but also of the
high-θ type to be as ∂nH/∂θL < 0. In the absence of the information barrier,
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the high-θ country could afford to build a smaller army, as the willingness of
its soldiers to defend, θH , is great. To see this result formally, compare the
army size under full information (17) and under imperfect information (19)
to find out
pH
√
1
θH
+ pL
√
1
θL
> pH
√
1
θH
+ pL
√
1
θH
=
√
1
θH
.
Under perfect information, a victim of type θL, would have to build a
larger army for deterrence. To establish that the solution qualifies for a
no-attack pooling equilibrium, it has to be shown that no incentives to devi-
ate from it exist under reasonable out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the predator .
Thus, if the predator observes a deviation from n*, say n < n∗, it might
think that probably the victim is of type high-θ. Such a belief does not,
however, appear rational. The predator is aware that the victim is actually
of type low-θ with a positive probability pL and has an incentive to mimic
the high-θ type. A more sensible belief for a predator is that the victim is
of type high-θ with lower probability, pH < 1. This means that the high-θ
cannot have an incentive to deviate from n*. QED
To recall, the focus in the above case was based on that deterrence is the
dominating strategy for the victim,
W (Cˆ, cˆ, C, c) > max
{
E[W (Cˆ, cˆ, C, c)], W s
}
for both types. Verbally, the cost of war and the loss in the surrender have
to be sufficiently high for both types of victims to detract the incentive to
adopt fighting or surrendering as the optimal choice.32
In the real world, countries may build different defence capabilities when
they cannot overlook a possible outside threat. In what conditions can a
separating equilibrium exist?
(b) Separating equilibrium: signalling with the army size Above,
it was suggested that differences in the country-specific intertemporal altru-
ism, fighting intensities in short, can result in a pooling equilibrium. In this
section, it is suggested that there may be reasons for a successful separa-
tion. This section therefore addresses the issue as to why it is the case that
32Explicit expressions for the threshold costs will not be stated as the argument is
evident.
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countries facing a similar predator invest different amounts of resources in
national defence..
Consider two potential victims v = (i, j). Differentiate them now by
their perceived costs of war (ki, kj). The role of potentially different fighting
intensities (θi, θj) are discussed subsequently. The choices concerning the
army size are (ni, nj). Using (1) and (2), the consumption per capita can be
solved as
Cˆv =
(
Y
2
)[
1− nv
N
]
, v = i, j.
Investment in the army represents the opportunity cost in terms of fore-
gone consumption. Building a large army, i.e., having a large defence budget
as a proportion of the population, n/N, reduces consumption Cˆ through
budget constraint. Without loss of generality, we simplify the notation by
choosing Y = 2. Denote the utility function of a civilian, undefined so far,
by U(Cˆv) = U(1− nvN ), U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, with Cˆv obtainable if there is no war
or if the war is won.
If the victim confronts a war, its probability of winning the battle is
Pv = 1−
√
m
θvnv
, v = i, j (20)
where (6) and (14) has been used.
The suggested equilibrium has the following structure: one type of victim,
say i, chooses a large army size with deterrence to match the indifference
condition of the predator, making the predator judge that it is of type i with
deterrence as the national target, while the other type, j, chooses a small
army size being exposed to an attack. Therefore, we should have ni > nj.
To qualify for an equilibrium, the incentives for non-deviation have to be
established. We let function Pij denote the army’s success probability in war
by if the victim i mimics victim j . The variables nij = nj, nji = ni denote
the army sizes under mimicking. The non-mimic condition of the country i
is
U(1− ni
N
) > PijU(1− nij
N
)− nPki (21)
where the right-hand side is the expected utility if victim i chooses a small
army, mimicking the victim j and subjecting itself to an attack.
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Similarly, the non-mimic condition of the victim j is
U(1− nji
N
) < PjU(1− nj
N
)− nPkj, (22)
Under what conditions can a pair (0 < nj < ni < N) exist that satisfies the
non-mimic conditions? To find the answer, let us fix the value of the army
size of the type i victim, ni, to satisfy the condition (17). Then ask under
what conditions, separation is obtained, i.e. nj < ni.
Without loss of generality, adopt a parametrisation for the utility function
U(.) = log(α+1− ni
N
). Consider the conditions around the given ni choosing
α = ni
N
, and making U(1− ni
N
) = 0 and U(1− nj
N
) = log(1+
ni−nj
N
) > 0. Then,
the first-non-mimic condition, (21), can be written as
npki >
(
1−
√
m
θinj
)
log(1 +
ni − nj
N
) > 0. (23)
When the perceived cost of war to the type i victim is sufficiently large, no
mimicking-incentive arises. With nji = ni, the second non-mimic condition,
(22), on the other hand, can be written as
npkj <
(
1−
√
m
θjnj
)
log(1 +
ni − nj
N
). (24)
Therefore, when the perceived cost of war to the type i victim is suf-
ficiently small, no mimicking incentive arises. Differences in the fighting
intensities have their roles to play as they interact with the probability of
winning the war, (20). High θi raises the threshold for the cost of war in
justifying the deterrence-target of country i. High θj reduces the maximum
cost of war which justifies the non-deterrence strategy.
To summarise,
PROPOSITION 5. Perceived differences in the cost of war can lead to
a separating equilibrium where a country facing a high cost of war builds a
large army, while a country facing a lower cost of war builds a smaller army.
This result is expressed in a rather moderate way. The reason is that the
deterrence condition (17) of type i with its army size ni has to be satisfied in
addition to the non-mimic condition. Moreover, for the j type to be willing
to have a small army, nj, its army size has to fullfill the optimality condition
to be derived in the next section.
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The existence of a separating equilibrium has been shown as conditional
on the willingess of the i-type to use a large army to signal its perceived cost
of war to the predator hence its willingness to defend. A separating equilib-
rium, however, may not exist univerally but is the subject of the conditions
stated. However, it is in line with the natural view of why the documented
survey results suggest strong national willingness to defend in some coun-
tries. The populations in potential victim countries may differ in terms of
their willingness to defend. While such differences may result from differences
in the valuation of the consumption relative to the national defence, the cur-
rent model suggests that ultimately, such differences need not be imbedded
in preferences but can instead be derived from differences in the perceived
costs of wars or in the intertemporal altruism.33
.
5. The Optimal Army Size Without Deter-
rence
In this section, the following question is raised: how many resources does a
utilitarian government of a j - type victim optimally allocate to the national
defence, knowing that deterrence is lost and that the war takes place in equi-
librium? A soldier career is more risky than a civilian career as a soldier
faces the risk of death even when the country is successful in defending. It
may therefore be that the civilians have to pay a premium to the defence
population to implement such a social contract. The problem faced by a
benevolent government is thus the potential interest conflict of the civilian
population and the defence population. Both value the life of future gen-
erations. Moreover, both understand that a larger army means a greater
probability of defeating the attacking predator if war breaks out. However,
the civilian population finances the consumption of the defence population
33As an example, Ukraine obviously had largely disregarded its investment in its defence
before the current crisis. However, when the military hostilities began in 2014, its army
was able to successfully resist the invasion of the Russian-backed attacking forces. Sweden
is another case. Its defence budget aligns with the defence budgets of its neighbours.
However, with the recently increased tension in the Baltic Sea area, it realised that its
abolishment of the draft army and the demilitarisation of its Gotland island were mistakes.
It has tried to reintroduce both, but has failed in its attempts of rebuilding of its defence
force through the draft.
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and tends to prefer a small army. The defence population prefers a larger
army, as this raises the survival of an individual soldier, though understand-
ing that the per capita consumption of both populations has to be cut down
when the size of the army becomes bigger. To settle the interest conflict,
a social contract is needed. To facilitate the implementation of the defence
policy, the equality of the expected utilities across the careers was suggested
in Section 2.1 as the criterion for the the structure of a social contract.
Denote the expected utilities of civilian and defence populations as
E [U ] = P
[
U(Cˆ(Y, cˆ, T, n)) + U(cˆ)
]
= 2PU(.)
E [V ] = [1− e∗ − σ(.)]u(C) + θP (n, e∗)v(c).
From the budget constraint (N − n)T = n(C + c) and from C = c, the
consumption of the military class is C = c =
(
N−n
2n
)
T . If the social contract
imposes equality between the expected utilities of the populations, we have
E[U ] = E[V ]. (25)
Summing up the expected utilities of the civilian adults and children and
of the military adults and children, the maximisation problem of a utilitarian
government is
maxn,T L(n, T, λ, µ) = 2(N−n)PU+nE [V ]−nPk+λ
[
T − 2n
N − nC
]
(26)
+µ {2PU − E [V ]} .
The shadow prices λ > 0 and µ ≷ 0 have been introduced to price the two
constraints.34
To study the first-order conditions for the interior optimum, recall from
the soldier’s first-order condition that ∂V/∂e∗ = 0, hence
∂V
∂n
=
∂V
∂e∗
∂e∗
∂n
= 0
34Without the latter constraint, the problem is a utilitarian one. With the equalitarian
constraint, the solution to the maximisatiohn problem is different except by chance. De-
pending on whether it is the civilian class or the soldier class whose share has to be cut
back, the associated shadow price µ may be positive or negative.
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∂V
∂T
=
∂V
∂e∗
∂e∗
∂n
∂n
∂T
= 0
Then, the social first-order conditions are simplified to
∂L
∂n
= −2PU + 2(N − n)PnU + E [V ]− λ 2C
(N − n)2 + 2µPnU = 0 (27)
∂L
∂T
= 2(N − n)PUT + λ+ 2µPUT = 0 (28)
∂L
∂λ
= T − 2n
N − nC = 0 (29)
∂L
∂µ
= E[U ]− E[V ] = 0. (30)
A notation UT = UCˆCˆT has been introduced in (28). From (28), the
marginal social valuation of the tax revenue is related to the marginal utility
of the civilian population as
λ = −2(N − n+ µ)PUT > 0, (31)
where UT < 0. Evaluate the derivative ∂L/∂n at n = 0 and at n = N,
∂L
∂n
|n=0= 2NPnU + E [V ]− λ2C
N2
+ 2µPnU
∂L
∂n
|n=N= −2PU + E [V ]− λ 2C
(0)2
+ 2µPnU.
For logical reasons, the first condition surely has to be positive; the second
one is definitively negative. As the functions are monotone, a unique interior
solution arises with 0 < n∗ < 1.
The optimal tax theory has taught our profession that it is not always
possible to arrive at explicit closed-form solutions for the optimal tax rates,
say. The best one can do it is to characterize the optimal solution. This is
also the case here. Intuitively, the first term in (27) represents the marginal
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social cost of having a larger national army n as the number of civilians
is reduced. Therefore, the first term is negative. The second term in (27)
represents the security gain to the civilians from a larger army in terms of a
greater probability of a successful war. The third term represents the social
gain for each soldier arising from a marginal increase in the army size. The
fourth term states that when the defence budget increases it enhances the
national security, but this increase comes with a higher tax liability cost to
be collected from the civilians. The final term is the required compensation
for the civilian population from an increased army size.
Denote the elasticity of the probability of the victory as
∂P
∂n
/
P
n
= εPn > 0 (32)
and the elasticity of the utility with respect to the tax cost as
∂U
∂T
/
U
T
= εUT < 0 (33)
Then, the first-order condition with respect to the army size can be used to
arrive at the premium in terms of the expected utilities of the military and
the civilian populations. Denote
E [V ]
2PU
= η. (34)
As 2C/T= (N − n)/n, the first-order condition (27) can be evaluated to
arrive at
η = 1−
(
N − n+ µ
n
)(
εPn +
1
N − nεUT
)
. (35)
In equilibrium, it must hold η = 1 if the social contract dictates equality
of the expected utilities for both professions. If the equality would not be
the aim, the premium should be bigger or smaller than 1 as εPn > 0 and
εUT < 0.
35 In equilibrium with η = 1 implying εPn + εUT/(N − n) = 0, the
size of the army satisfies
n = N − | εUT |
εPn
. (36)
35If the welfare maximising η is smaller than 1, it cannot obviously be imposed on a
voluntary basis.
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To summarise:
PROPOSITION 6. The social contract dictates that the optimal army
size of a victim of j-type is negatively related to (the absolute value of) the
elasticity of the utility with respect to the tax cost and positively related to
the elasticity of the probability of the victory with respect to the army size.
Finally, we conclude that the effect of intergenerational altruism on the
optimal army size remains ambiguous and depends on the preferences of
the civilian population, U . A higher θ raises both the denominator and the
numerator in (34)
6. Final Remarks
Creating the national security requires that part of the population be re-
cruited into the military as soldiers with a commitment to undertake risky
operational actions if the country becomes the victim of a hostile predator.
The current paper has shown that in a commitment equilibrium, the defend-
ing army, particularly a small one, fights hard. As an implication, the paper
has offered a novel theory of deterrence and defence policy. It was shown that
in the absence of informational constraints, there is a unique army size, suffi-
cient enough to deter an attack. Under informational restrictions, a pooling
equilibrium may exist where a victim with strong intergenerational altruism
has to overinvest in its army. Instead, for deterrence, the victim with a more
limited altruism can free ride on the information gap of the predator, invest-
ing less in the defence than it would have to do under full information. It was
also shown that the case of separating equilibrium may exist in which a large
army can be used as a signal of a high willingness to defend particularly when
the cosr of war is perceievd to be large. A victim with a smaller willingness
to defend, however, risks a military confrontation with the enemy. The paper
has thus arrived at the remarkable result that the socially optimal defence
policy does not need to provide a sufficient deterrence against the potential
predator. The analysis and results point to the role of (implicit) pre-conflict
communication between a potential victim and a potential predator. For
deterrence, credible signals concerning the willingness to defend have to be
developed particularly if the potential predator is uncertain about the type
of victim it is targeting. The army size may operate as such a signal.
.
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